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BORDENKIRCHER v. HAYES: PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION DURING PLEA BARGAINING
INTRODUCTION
Paul Lewis Hayes was indicted by a Fayette County, Kentucky
grand jury on a charge of uttering a forged instrument, an offense
punishable by a prison term of two to ten years.' During plea nego-
tiations, the prosecutor offered to recommend a sentence of five years
in prison in return for Hayes' pleading guilty. He also told Hayes that
if he did not plead guilty, he would be reindicted under the Kentucky
Habitual Criminal Act, which would, upon conviction of this third
felony offense, subject Hayes to a mandatory sentence of life imprison-
ment.2 Hayes refused to plead guilty and the prosecutor carried out
his threat. Hayes was subsequently convicted and received a life sen-
tence pursuant to the Habitual Criminal statute.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected Hayes' constitutional
objections to the mandatory life sentence.3 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed Hayes' petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.4 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that
the "vindictive exercise of [the] prosecutor's discretion . . . [placed
Hayes] in fear of retaliatory action for insisting upon his constitu-
tional right to stand trial," 5 thus violating the principles of North
Carolina v. Pearce6 and Blackledge v. Perry.1 The United States Su-
preme Court reversed. The Court found that "no . . . element of
punishment or retaliation," as prohibited by Pearce and Perry, existed
in the "'give-and-take' of plea bargaining" involved here. Borden-
kircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978).
1. Ky. Rav. STAT. § 434.130 (repealed 1974).
2. Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.190 (repealed 1974).
3. Hayes v. Cowan, No. 73-766 (Ky., filed March 1, 1974). Hayes appealed on
three grounds: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, (2) that
the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the requirement of corroboration
of the testimony of an accomplice, and (3) that he was denied due process of law be-
cause the mandatory life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
4. Hayes v. Cowan, No. 75-61 (E.D. Ky., filed June 11, 1975). In Hayes' peti-
tion, he asserted that selective application of the habitual criminal statute constituted
cruel and unusual punishment and that the vindictive application of that statute was
an unconstitutional implementation of plea bargaining which violated his right to due
process of law.
5. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 44-45 (6th Cir. 1976).
6. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
7. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
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I. PLEA BARGAINING AND DISCRETIONARY LIMITATIONS ON THE
RESENTENCING OF DEFENDANTS
Plea bargaining has become an essential, although controversial,8
component of the criminal justice system, 9 enabling prosecutors to ob-
tain guilty pleas in return for promises of leniency in charging or
recommending sentences. The decision to plead guilty is of grave im-
portance to a criminal defendant, for in so doing he waives his fifth
amendment right not to incriminate himself as well as his sixth amend-
ment rights to a jury trial and confrontation of his accusers.' 0 For this
reason, the courts accept only those guilty pleas which appear to be
voluntarily and intelligently made." Surprisingly, considering the
gravity of the rights involved, the Supreme Court did not fully ad-
dress the issue of the validity of plea bargaining until recently. "For
decades it was a sub rosa process shrouded in secrecy and deliberately
concealed by participating defendants, defense lawyers, prosecutors,
and even judges."' 2 The Supreme Court first indicated its acceptance
of plea bargaining in Brady v. United States.1 In Brady, the defend-
ant claimed that his guilty plea was involuntary because the Kidnap-
ping Act 14 provided for the death penalty only in jury trials, and thus
coerced his plea.' 5 The Court held Brady's guilty plea to be valid, and
8. See, e.g., Berger, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A.J. 621 (1976);
White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. Rnv. 439,
449-53 (1971); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. Rv.
1387 (1970); 19 STAN. L. REV. 1082 (1967); Comment, Official Inducements to
Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32 U. CI. L. REv. 167 (1964);
Note, Pleas of Guilty, 18 U. IKAN. L. REV. 729, 751 (1970).
9. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 135 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as CHALLENGE OF CRIME]. In some jurisdictions guilty pleas account for the disposition
of as many as 95% of all criminal cases. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 299
(1974). See also CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra at 134, citing a figure of 90%.
10. "A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an
extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive.
More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence."
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
11. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) ("The standard [for de-
termining the validity of a guilty plea is] whether the plea represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.");
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
12. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977) (footnote omitted). The de-
fendant in Blackledge was instructed to deny that any plea bargaining had taken place
so that his guilty plea would be accepted by the judge. See also CHALLENOE OF CRIME,
supra note 9, at 134; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
13. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. 1977).
15. See text accompanying notes 76-80 infra.
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in doing so equated it with guilty pleas obtained in a number of plea
bargaining situations.16 Finally, in Santobello v. New York,n7 the Court
held plea bargaining to be constitutional, and acknowledged it as a
necessary practice; without it, "the States and the Federal Govern-
ment would need to multiply by many times the number of judges
and court facilities."' 8 In Blackledge v. Allison, 9 the Court praised
the plea bargaining process, saying that it works to the benefit of all
concerned:
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anx-
ieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of
his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in
realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges
and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is
protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses
who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal pro-
ceedings.
20
In plea bargaining, as in other areas, courts and prosecutors are
vested with enormous discretion,2' but a number of cases have made
it clear that under no circumstances may the prosecutor or the court
exercise its discretion in a vindictive manner that interferes with a
defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights.
In North Carolina v. Pearce,22 the Supreme Court held that a
court may not impose a heavier sentence upon a defendant for hav-
ing successfully appealed his first conviction. Such action, said the
Court, constitutes a violation of the defendant's procedural due
process rights, since it imposes a penalty for the exercise of his right
to appeal or to collaterally attack a conviction. The court still has
the power, upon retrial, "to impose whatever sentence may be legally
authorized, whether or not it is greater than the sentence imposed
after the first conviction, ' 23 but vindictiveness against the defendant
for successfully appealing his conviction must play no part in such
resentencing;2 4 the very possibility of this retaliation serves to "chill
16. 397 U.S. at 751.
17. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
18. Id. at 260.
19. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
20. Id. at 71 (footnote omitted).
21. See, e.g., K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 224
(1969); ASSOCIATION OF TIHE BAR OF THE CITY o NEw YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON COURIROOM CONDUCT, DISORDER IN THE COURT 170-78 (1973).
22. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
23. Id. at 720 (footnote omitted).
24. Id. at 725. See also Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).
1978]
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the exercise of [those] basic constitutional rights" by those still in
prison.2 5 The Court formulated a rule to insure the absence of such
vindictiveness: whenever a defendant receives a greater sentence upon
retrial, the reasons for imposing the greater sentence must appear in
the record, and imposition of the greater sentence must be based on
"identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the
time of the original sentencing proceeding." 26 This in effect created
a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness which could be overcome
by a showing of the requisite amount of "identifiable conduct." 27
Although Pearce addressed itself only to the sentencing decisions
of the courts, a number of lower courts have applied the Pearce prin-
ciple to prosecutorial discretion. In Sefcheck v. Brewer28 the district
court found the prosecutor's reindictment of the defendant on a more
serious charge, after the defendant had been granted a writ of habeas
corpus, to be impermissible in the absence of a "legally justified, com-
pelling reason .... -29 In United States v. Jamison,30 the court ap-
plied Pearce to a situation involving reindictment of the defendant
on a more serious charge after the defendant had been granted a mis-
trial. To overcome the possibility of vindictiveness, it was held, the
record must contain proof of "intervening events or ... new evidence
of which the government was excusably unaware at the time of the
first indictment." 31 In United States v. Gerard,2 a case factually simi-
lar to Hayes, the Ninth Circuit held that the prosecutor's conduct vio-
lated the Pearce principle when he reindictqd a defendant on an extra
count after the defendant withdrew a guilty plea.83
The Supreme Court finally applied the Pearce principle to prose-
cutorial conduct in Blackledge v. Perry.3 4 The prosecutor successfully
sought to indict Perry for a felony after he had been granted a trial
de novo for a misdemeanor conviction. The indictment covered the
25. 395 U.S. at 724 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582
(1968)).
26. 395 U.S. at 726.
27. The Pearce court implied the existence of this rebuttable presumption when it
required that "the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made
part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may
be fully reviewed on appeal." Id.
28. 301 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. Iowa 1969).
29. Id. at 795.
30. 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
31. Id. at 417.
32. 491 F.2d 1300, 1304-07 (9th Cir. 1974).
33. But see Percy v. South Dakota, 443 F.2d 1232 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 886 (1971).
34. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
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same conduct for which the defendant had originally been tried and
convicted.3 The Court stated:
[a] person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory
right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will re-
taliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one....
Due process of law requires that such a potential for vindictiveness
must not enter into North Carolina's two-tiered appellate process. 36
The Ninth Circuit extended Perry to a situation involving pretrial
conduct in United States v. Ruesga-Martine.37 There, the prosecutor
obtained a felony indictment against the defendant under a habitual
offender statute, after initially charging him with a misdemeanor, be-
cause the defendant refused to waive his right to be tried by a district
judge and a jury. The court reversed and remanded, holding that "the
prosecution bears a heavy burden of proving that any increase in the
severity of the alleged charges was not motivated by a vindictive mo-
tive." 8 It would seem, then, that "prosecutorial vindictiveness can be
35. Id. at 23.
36. Id. at 28.
37. 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976). In a number of cases, however, courts have
upheld reindictments on more serious charges pursuant to the standards set by Pearce
and Perry. In Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912), decided well before those
cases, the defendant was originally indicted for assault, but the prosecutor was allowed
to reindict him for homicide when the victim died subsequent to the original trial. In
United States ex rel. William v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 914 (1971), the Second Circuit upheld the prosecutor's actions when he re-
indicted the defendant on more serious charges after the defendant withdrew his guilty
plea. The court based its decision on the fact that the defendant had originally been
indicted on the more serious charge, which had been dropped in return for his guilty
plea. In United States v. Butler, 414 F. Supp. 394 (D. Conn. 1976), the court found it
permissible to reindict the defendant on an extra charge for an act which occurred
after those for which he was initially charged. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v.
Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976), approved
the prosecutor's reindictment of the defendant on two extra counts after the prosecutor
learned of new facts during testimony at the initial trial which supported the extra
charges, thus expanding Perry from "identifiable conduct" occurring after the original
sentencing to cover the acquisition of new facts by the prosecutor relating to prior
conduct. See also notes and text accompanying notes 31-32.
The impact of the Perry rule was diminished in the Eighth Circuit in Percy v.
South Dakota, 443 F.2d 1232 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971). Percy
had been convicted of indecent molestation of a five year old child, for which he re-
ceived a sentence of forty years in the state penitentiary. Upon the reversal of that con-
viction, he was reindicted for kidnapping, based on the same event as the reversed in-
decent molestation conviction. Percy was found guilty of kidnapping and sentenced to
life imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit upheld this conviction and the greater sentence,
stating "[w]e do not interpret the decision in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, to apply
to another offense arising out of the same transaction." 443 F.2d at 1237.
38. 534 F.2d at 1369 (footnote omitted).
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no less an affront to those values we characterize as 'due process' than
judicial vindictiveness." 39
The Supreme Court decisions in Pearce and Perry dealt with re-
indictment or resentencing after prior convictions had been over-
turned. Even those lower court decisions involving pretrial rights did
not involve plea bargaining. Thus, it remained unclear, until Paul
Hayes' reindictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal statute,
how the Pearce rule would be applied to the process of plea bar-
gaining.
II. BORDENKIRCHER V. HAYES
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, stated that the decision
was based on the unique characteristics of the plea bargaining process.
The Court acknowledged the vital role of plea bargaining in the
functioning of the criminal justice system, and equated Hayes' rein-
dictment on the more serious charge with the situation in which the
defendant had been indicted "as a recidivist from the outset, and the
prosecutor had offered to drop that charge as part of the plea bar-
gain." 40 The Court distinguished Pearce and Perry as cases dealing
with the imposition of penalties on defendants' constitutional rights
to appeal, which it considered "very different from the give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and
the defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining
power."
41
In making this distinction, the Court also cited "'the mutuality
of advantage' to defendants and prosecutors" and the fact that the
"accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer."42 The
Court said that the very acceptance of plea bargaining as a method of
obtaining guilty pleas recognizes both that the prosecutor has an in-
terest in inducing the defendant to plead guilty, and that the defend-
ant must choose between accepting the prosecution's offer (thus waiv-
ing his procedural rights) or facing the risk of more severe punish-
ment upon conviction. That a defendant is induced to plead guilty
39. United States ex rel. Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103, 105 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971) (footnote omitted).
40. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663, 666 (1978). The Court of Appeals
found the two situations to be distinguishable, holding that the first contained an im-
permissible possibility of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 44-
45 (6th Cir. 1976).
41. 98 S. Ct. at 667 (citing Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809
(1970)).
42. 98 S. Ct. at 668.
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by the prosecutor's promises of leniency does not detract from the vol-
untariness of the plea. The Court held that while there are constitu-
tional limits to the exercise of a prosecutor's discretion, the prosecu-
tor's actions in the present case did not exceed those limits. The
defendant was merely forced to make a choice regarding his exercise
of constitutional rights within the acceptable bounds of the essential
practice of plea bargaining.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dis-
sented. He saw the thrust of Perry to be the prohibition of prosecu-
torial vindictiveness, and felt that the Perry rule requiring the prose-
cution to rebut the possibility of vindictiveness should have been
extended to the process of plea bargaining.43 Justice Blackmun found
"little difference between vindictiveness after .. . the exercise of a
'legal right to attack his original conviction,' and vindictiveness in the
'give-and-take negotiation common to plea bargaining.' 44 Reindict-
ing Hayes under the Habitual Criminal statute created a "'strong in-
ference' of vindictiveness" which required the prosecution to "justify
its action on some basis other than discouraging respondent [Hayes]
from the exercise of his right to a trial."45 In this case, in fact, Black-
mun found proof of such vindictiveness, citing the prosecutor's re-
marks at trial.46 Justice Blackmun realized that the application of the
Pearce principle to plea bargaining might lead to prosecutors' bring-
ing the greatest possible charge in every case so as to avoid scrutiny
under Pearce, but, nonetheless, found it "far preferable to hold the
prosecution to the charge it was originally content to bring and to
justify in the eyes of its public. '47
Justice Powell, dissenting in a separate opinion, also felt that the
prosecutor's actions denied Hayes due process, citing the prosecutor's
remarks as evidence of his intent to discourage Hayes' exercise of his
43. Id. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. During cross-examination the prosecutor asked Hayes:
Isn't it a fact that I told you at [the initial bargaining session] that if you
did not intend to plead guilty to five years for this charge and ... save the
court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial and taking up this time that
I intended to return to the grand jury and ask them to indict you based upon
these prior felony convictions?
Id. at 665 n.1. See also Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 43 n.2 (6th Cir. 1976). Obvi-
ously, justice Blackmun felt that the prosecutor was more concerned with "getting
back" at Hayes for not pleading guilty rather than "saving the court the inconvenience
and necessity of a trial."
47. 98 S. Ct. at 670 (footnote omitted).
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constitutional rights.48 His decision, however, was based not on the
prosecutor's timing, but rather on the impropriety of the charge con-
sidering the conduct on which it was based. It would have been "un-
reasonable and not in the public interest to put this defendant in
jeopardy of a sentence of life imprisonment" in the first instance, for
forging an $88.30 check, and Justice Powell found it equally unrea-
sonable to escalate the charge after Hayes had refused to plead guilty.49
Justice Powell did state, however, that "a prosecutor would be
fully justified in seeking a fresh indictment for a more serious offense
[if] it would have been reasonable and in the public interest initially
to have charged the defendant with the greater offense."' ' 0 Thus, his
opinion may be read as supporting the majority's view except in cases
where there is clear proof of improper motive on the part of the prose-
cutor, in this case the bringing of a charge not warranted by the facts.
III. VALmTY OF GUILTY PLEAS AND METHODS OF OBTAINING
GuILTY PLEAS IN LIGHT OF HAYES
Courts in the past have recognized the need to limit prosecutorial
discretion and have made some attempts to check such abuse, both
within the context of obtaining guilty pleas,5' as well as in other
areas.52 For example, to insure adequate appellate review of the vol-
untariness and validity of a plea a record must be made of the judi-
cial proceedings in which the guilty plea is offered.5 In Hayes, the
48. Id. at 671 (Powell, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 672.
50. Id.
51. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra. A prosecutor's promise made
during plea bargaining must be kept by his successor when the defendant relies on it
and pleads guilty. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). A defendant's re-
marks made during plea negotiations, and the very fact that he entered into plea nego-
tiations, is inadmissible as evidence against him at trial. United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d
771 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Fn. R. CIm. P. 11(e) (6) (1976).
52. For example, a prosecutor may not use a criminal proceeding to forestall a
civil suit by the defendant against a policeman. McDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970). In general, a prosecutor may not exer-
cise discrimination with regard to which individuals he chooses to prosecute. See gen-
erally Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 588 (1961);
United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d
1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Orowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1080 (4th Cir.
1972); Washington v. United States, 401 F.2d 915, 924-25 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Moss v.
Hornig, 314 F.2d 89, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1963), at least so far as such discrimination is
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classifi-
cations, see Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962), though claims of such discrimi-
natory prosecution have often proven difficult to sustain in the face of burdens put on
the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973).
53. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969).
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Court had to decide whether to extend the prophylactic rule of Pearce
and its progeny to prosecutorial conduct during plea bargaining and
to require a showing of "identifiable conduct on the part of the de-
fendant ' 5 4 occurring during the plea negotiations to justify a re-indict-
ment of the defendant on a more serious charge.
More exactly, the question confronted by the Court was one of
timing; whether the prosecutor's course of conduct was truly analo-
gous to the typical plea bargaining situation in which a prosecutor
initially brings the more severe charge and later offers to drop it in
return for a guilty plea, 55 or whether it differed from that situation
to such an extent as to constitute constitutionally impermissible be-
havior. If the decision initially to indict Hayes without the Habitual
Criminal charge and later threaten him with it upon his refusal to
to plead guilty were held not to be within the acceptable parameters
of plea bargaining, then it might well be proper to invoke the Pearce
rule and require a showing of "identifiable conduct" to justify the re-
indictment on that charge.
Although the Pearce and Perry decisions place much emphasis on
vindictiveness,5 6 there seem to be four main factors discussed in Pearce
and Perry, as well as in Hayes, that must be considered in determin-
ing the validity of the prosecutor's actions in Hayes: (1) the extent
to which such conduct constitutes punishment of the defendant's ex-
ercise of his constitutional right to plead not guilty, 57 (2) the possible
deterrent effect on other similarly situated defendants from exercising
their constitutional rights to plead not guilty,58 (3) the voluntariness
of a plea of guilty in this type of situation,59 and (4) the possibility
of vindictiveness on the part of the prosecutor.6°
54. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969).
55. The majority indicated that it would have been proper for the prosecutor to
have initially indicted defendant Hayes under the Habitual Criminal Act. 98 S. Ct. at
666. Contra, id. at 672 (Powell, J., dissenting); ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIN-
MENT PROCEDURES § 350.3(3) (b) (1975); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function § 2.5(b), suggesting that
it is not always proper for a prosecutor to seek an indictment on the maximum charge
possible based on the facts before him.
56. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969); Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974).
57. See 98 S. Ct. at 666-68; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 25; North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724.
58. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 28; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
at 724-25.
59. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S.
275, 286 (1941); Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293, 294-95 (10th Cir. 1957);
United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
60. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 27; Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104,
116 (1972); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
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The first factor, punishment, was emphasized in Pearce when the
Court stated that the State may not impose a penalty on those de-
fendants who have successfully exercised their constitutional rights.
It can hardly be doubted that it would be a flagrant violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment for a state trial court to follow an announced
practice of imposing a heavier sentence upon every reconvicted de-
fendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant for his
having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside. Where
• ..the original conviction has been set aside because of a constitu-
tional error, the imposition of such a punishment, "penalizing those
who choose to exercise" constitutional rights, "would be patently
unconstitutional." . . . But even if the first conviction has been set
aside for nonconstitutional error, the imposition of a penalty upon
the defendant for having successfully pursued a statutory right of
appeal, or collateral remedy would be no less a violation of due
process of law.61
In Hayes the Court interpreted the thrust of Pearce and Perry as be-
ing against such punishment or retaliation,62 but found no such ele-
ment in the " 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining."63 The Court thus
implicitly held the prosecutor's actions to be free of any element of
punishment when it equated his actions with the normal plea bar-
gaining scenario of initially indicting Hayes on the greater charge and
offering to drop it in return for a guilty plea.6'
In either situation the defendant is faced with the choice between
waiving procedural rights (right to trial, right to plead not guilty,
right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt) and facing the
greater punishment upon conviction. Nonetheless, the two types of
plea bargaining situations do have important differences. The prose-
cutor's timing in Hayes (i.e., bringing the greater charge after the
defendant has refused the plea offer) at least strongly resembles pun-
ishment for not pleading guilty to the lesser charge. If the prosecutor
had orginally set the stakes higher by charging Hayes under the Ha-
bitual Criminal statute in the first indictment, this could not have
been punishment since the prosecutor would not yet have known
whether Hayes would choose to exercise his procedural rights or ac-
cept the plea offer. 65 Resetting the stakes after Hayes did in fact
61. 395 U.S. at 723, 724 (footnote omitted). See also Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. at 25; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24 (1973).
62. 98 S. Ct. at 667-68.
63. Id. at 668.
64. Id. at 666.
65. This statement, as well as the entire analysis of the case, is based upon the
assumption that it would have been proper for Hayes to have been indicted under the
[Vol. 27
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choose to exercise those rights can be nothing less than unaccept-
able punishment. The distinction between the two prosecutorial
approaches may appear to be small, as it did to the majority, but it
assumes greater importance if the rule prohibiting punishment of
defendants' exercise of constitutional rights is viewed not only as a
safeguard for defendants, but as a method of enhancing the public
confidence in the criminal justice system and the officers entrusted
with running that system. 66 The courts must guard against the ap-
pearance of impropriety in prosecutorial behavior,67 as well as the
actual abuse of defendants' rights. That Hayes had been warned dur-
ing the plea negotiations of the possibility of indictment on the more
serious charge justified the prosecutor's actions, according to the ma-
jority.(s This seems to be nothing more than a distinction between
punishing, and threatening to punish and then carrying out that
threat. If the first is unacceptable, the second should be considered
no better.
The second factor, that of the possible deterrent. effect on other
similarly situated defendants, is not given much weight by the
courts.69 Nevertheless, the courts do cite the possible deterrent effect
of official behavior on defendants' exercise of their constitutional
rights as at least one of the factors to take into account in protecting
defendants' rights. In Pearce, the Court stated that "due process also
Habitual Criminal statute initially. See 98 S. Ct. at 670, n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). See also note 55 supra. Contra, 98 S. Ct. at 672 (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. See 98 S. Ct. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting): "[I]t is far preferable to
hold the prosecution to the charge it was originally content to bring and to justify in
the eyes of its public" even if this results in prosecutors bringing the greater charge
initially in every case. In a footnote, Justice Blackmun continued:
[I]t is healthful to keep charging practices visible to the general public, so that
political bodies can judge whether the policy being followed is a fair one.
Visibility is enhanced if the prosecutor is required to lay his cards on the table
with an indictment of public record at the beginning of the bargaining process,
rather than making use of unrecorded verbal warnings of more serious indict-
ments yet to come.
Id. at 670, n.2.
67. Id. See also Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 27-29 (emphasizing the "real-
istic likelihood of 'vindictiveness'" and the "potential for vindictiveness"); United
States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding the "appearance of
vindictiveness" to be constitutionally impermissible). Though these cases dealt more with
vindictiveness, the fourth factor to be discussed, than with punishment, the "public re-
lations" aspects of Justice Blackmun's dissent, note 66 supra, are mirrored in the courts'
concern with "appearances" and "potentials."
68. 98 S. Ct. at 666.
69. Though deterrence does receive some mention, none of the plea bargaining or




requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of . . .a retalia-
tory motivation" on the part of the sentencing judge.70 The Pearce
Court noted that the possible "chilling effect" of such apprehension
on the exercise of constitutional rights by other defendants is viola-
tive of due process.71 Fear of retaliation by the state should not be
allowed to deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or col-
laterally attack his first conviction,72 nor should it be allowed to deter
the exercise of the right to plead not guilty. The majority in Hayes
explicitly minimized the importance of the potential deterrent effect
on defendants. 73 Considering, however, the possible punitive and re-
taliatory nature of the prosecutor's actions, 74 it may well be that if
such methods were to become widespread, defendants would accept
harsh plea bargaining agreements out of fear that they would be re-
indicted on greater charges should they refuse-a fear justified by the
Supreme Court's endorsement of that procedure in Hayes.
The third factor, voluntariness, is perhaps the most important of
the four in determining the validity of a plea. In a number of cases,
courts have found the lack of voluntariness of a plea to be sufficient
cause for invalidating a conviction. In Walker v. Johnston5 the Su-
preme Court held that a prosecutor could not deceive or coerce a de-
fendant into pleading guilty. Courts have found coercion sufficient to
reverse convictions in situations where defendants were threatened
with physical violence,76 physically coerced,77 or threatened with the
imposition of the maximum sentence possible.71 In Pearce, the Court
stated that
A court is "without right to . . .put a price on an appeal. A de-
fendant's exercise of right of appeal must be free and unfettered....
[I]t is unfair to use the great power given the court to determine
sentence to place a defendant in the dilemma of making an unfree
choice." 79
70. 395 U.S. at 725.
71. Id. at 724.
72. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
73. "The Court has emphasized that the due process violation in cases such as
Pearce and Perry lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the
exercise of a legal right .. " 98 S. Ct. at 667 (citations omitted).
74. See text accompanying notes 65-68, supra.
75. 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
76. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942). In Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227, 239 (1940) the defendant was filled with "terror and frightful misgivings."
77. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956).
78. Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293, 294-95 (10th Cir. 1957); United
States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).




The facts of Hayes precluded significant discussion of voluntari-
ness because Hayes did not in fact plead guilty; thus he could not
claim that his plea had been coerced by the prosecutor. Notwithstand-
ing this factual setting, a discussion of voluntariness might still be
appropriate if couched in terms of whether the prosecutor's actions
imposed an "impermissible burden" on the defendant, a term formu-
lated by the Court in United States v. Jackson.s0 The Jackson Court
held section 1201 (a) of the Kidnapping Act8' to be unconstitutional,
finding that it imposed an "impermissible burden" upon the assertion
of a constitutional right.8 2 The Jackson holding might theoretically be
applied to a case such as Hayes where the defendant was not in fact
coerced into giving up any constitutional rights, but was nevertheless
faced with a choice arguably constituting an "impermissible bur-
den."18 It would seem, however, that the prosecutor's timing in Hayes
cannot be distinguished from the normal plea barganing scenario on
an "impermissible burden" theory. Whether the prosecutor indicted
Hayes under the Habitual Criminal statute initially, later offering to
drop that charge, or chose not to bring the charge initially, later
threatening to bring it, Hayes would have been faced with the same
choice: plead guilty and take the five year sentence, or pjlead not guilty
and face the possibility of a life sentence.84 Thus, if the "impermis-
80. 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. 1977).
82. Section 1201(a) of the Kidnapping Act provided for the death penalty "if
the verdict of the jury shall so recommend." There was no procedure for imposing the
death penalty on a defendant who pleaded guilty or waived a jury trial. The defendant
in Jackson claimed that the risk of death was the price he had to pay for asserting the
right to a jury trial. The Court held that this discouraged the assertion of the fifth
amendment right to plead not guilty and deterred the exercise of the sixth amendment
right to demand a jury trial, which resulted in the imposition of an impermissible burden
upon the assertion of a constitutional right. The evil in the statute was not that it
"necessarily coerces . . . but simply that it needlessly encourages [guilty pleas and jury
waivers]." 390 U.S. at 583.
83. In Hayes, however, the majority indicated that voluntariness could never
be brought into question in a plea bargaining situation. 98 S. Ct. at 668.
84. The application of the "impermissible burden" theory of Jackson was called
into question by the Court's holding in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
In Brady, the Court refused to set aside the conviction of a defendant who had pleaded
guilty under the same statute invalidated by the Jackson decision. The Court held that,
although the death penalty provision tended to discourage a defendant from entering a
plea of not guilty, a guilty plea entered under that statute was not necessarily involun-
tary:
[E]ven if we assume that Brady would not have pleaded guilty except for the
death penalty provision of § 1201(a), this assumption merely identifies the
penalty provision as a "but for" cause of his plea. That the statute caused
the plea in this sense does not necessarily prove that the plea was coerced and
invalid as an involuntary act.
1978]
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sible burden" theory were held to be applicable it would invalidate
both types of plea bargaining. Clearly it does not invalidate the first; 5
and therefore it cannot invalidate the second.
The fourth factor, vindictiveness, is a more subjective factor, and
may be viewed as pervading the other three in its application to prose-
cutorial conduct.86 In Perry, the Court based much of its decision on
the "realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness' " posed by the prosecutor's
behavior.8 7 In Colten v. Kentucky,88 the Supreme Court specifically
cited vindictiveness as an important factor in determining the valid-
ity of a higher sentence imposed on a defendant after a trial de novo,
although it denied the defendant relief by finding that "[t]he pos-
sibility of vindictiveness, found to exist in Pearce, is not inherent in
the Kentucky two-tier system."89
The majority in Hayes made only brief mention of vindictive-
ness, and implied that it was not a factor in "the give-and-take nego-
tiation common in plea bargaining .... -90 Thus, it refused to ex-
Id. at 750. Thus, it would seem that a defendant faced with an unconstitutional choice
would still have to prove that the choice actually made his actions involuntary, an
impossible task for a defendant such as Hayes who had pleaded not guilty.
The Supreme Court, in two other cases, also refused to invalidate guilty pleas which
had been entered after allegedly coerced confessions. In Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790 (1970), the Court Stated that "an otherwise valid plea is not involuntary be-
cause induced by the defendant's desire to limit the possible maximum penalty to less
than that authorized if there is a jury trial." Id. at 795. In McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970), the defendants were truly faced with a difficult choice of constitutional
proportions. At the time of defendants' trials, the New York procedure was for the jury
to determine the voluntariness of the confession as well as the defendant's guilt. Rather
than face the possibility that allegedly involuntary confessions would be offered against
them, the defendants chose to plead guilty. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions,
reasoning that if the defendants' confessions had really been involuntary, they would
have gone to trial since the confessions would have been unusable. Id. at 768.
The "Brady trilogy" (Brady, Parker, and McMann) has been criticized as imposing
a rule of absolute waiver of constitutional rights upon a plea of guilty. See Alschuler,
The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. CoLo. L. REv. I,
55 (1975); Note, The Waivability by Guilty Plea of Retroactively Endowed Constitu-
tional Rights, 41 ALB. L. REv. 115 (1977). The Court retreated from this position
(if indeed it had ever taken it) in Blackledge v. Perry holding a defendant's guilty plea
invalid when it was induced by the prosecutor's having reindicted him on a more serious
charge after obtaining a trial de novo. 417 U.S. at 24-29.
85. See text accompanying notes 8, 9, 17-20 supra.
86. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 27 (1974). There the Court stated
that the "lesson that emerges from Pearce, Colten, and Chaflin is that the Due Process
Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after ap-
peal, but only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness.' "
87. 417 U.S. at 27, 29. See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
88. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
89. Id. at 116.




tend Pearce to require a showing of "identifiable conduct on the part
of the defendant" 91 occurring after the initial indictment to justify
the reindictment. Conversely, the dissent emphasized the importance
of the "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness" in the prosecutor's ac-
tions,92 finding that vindictiveness was "present to the same extent as
it was thought to be in Pearce and in Perry .... ."93 The dissent's
analysis of vindictiveness is similar to that found in United States v.
Gerard.94 There, the Ninth Circuit disallowed the reindictment, con-
viction, and sentencing of a defendant on an extra count after he had
withdrawn his guilty plea from a lesser charge. The court interpreted
Pearce as holding that "absent some proper reason affirmatively shown
for imposing a longer sentence after the first had been vacated by rea-
son of error committed at the trial, an increase of sentence was con-
stitutionally impermissible as bearing the appearance of vindictiveness
for taking the appeal ....
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the potential for vindic-
tive reactions by a court whose findings have been challenged, 96 or on
the part of a judge who has been reversed.97 Similarly, a prosecutor
whose offer of leniency for a guilty plea has been rebuffed might be
moved to retaliate with vindictive acts, such as reindicting the de-
fendant on more serious charges. In Brady, after citing examples of
acceptable plea bargaining scenarios, the Court stated: "We here make
no reference to the situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both, de-
liberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a par-
ticular defendant to tender a plea of guilty."98s In Gerard, the court
specifically distinguished the situation in which the prosecutor rein-
dicts the defendant on charges which have already been brought in
the initial indictment (acceptable) from the situation in which the
prosecutor adds new charges upon reindictment without any factual
91. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
92. 98 S. Ct. at 669 (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 27).
93. Id. at 670.
94. 491 F.2d at 1304.
95 Id.
96. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
97. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24-26 (1973).
98. 397 U.S. at 751, n.8. The Court did not, however, explicitly declare that type
of conduct to be impermissible. The footnote continued: "In Brady's case there is no
claim that the prosecutor threatened prosecution on a charge not justified by the evi-
dence or that the trial judge threatened Brady with a harsher sentence if convicted after
trial in order to induce him to plead guilty." Id. Thus, the Court at least left open the
question of whether it would be acceptable for the prosecutor to threaten a defendant
with a charge justified by the evidence.
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justification (unacceptable)." The fact that the defendant withdrew
his guilty plea and the prosecutor was therefore allowed to "reset the
stakes" did not make the latter situation any more acceptable. 10 0 It
seems that the Hayes majority should have followed the lead of the
Ninth Circuit in Gerard in condemning such behavior.
I
CONCLUSION
Plea bargaining is an invaluable tool of the prosecutor, and, when
properly used, benefits both defendants and society.1°1 The broad dis-
cretion vested in the prosecutor, however, creates a great potential for
abuse of defendants' constitutional rights. Hayes opens the door to the
possibility that prosecutorial discretion to charge will be used as a
weapon of retaliation in plea negotiations. The case emphasizes the
need for the formulation of guidelines to govern prosecutorial con-
duct during plea bargaining. Along these lines, it has been suggested
that there is a need for judicial presence to inform the parties of the
acceptability to the court of agreements reached by them and to in-
sure fairness in the negotiations, 102 and a need for uniformity of de-
cisions, so that similarly situated defendants are given similar choices
during plea negotiations. 103
The Court in Hayes balked at a chance to apply the Pearce rule
governing prosecutorial conduct to plea bargaining. The plea bargain-
ing process would not have been substantially hampered if the Pearce
rule had been adopted and prosecutors had been required to justify
the reindictment of defendants on greater charges with a showing of
"identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant"'1 4 occurring after
99. 491 F.2d at 1306.
100. See generally CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 9, at 135, in which the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice stated that,
"[t]here are also real dangers that ...prosecutors will threaten to seek a harsh sentence
if the defendant does not plead guilty. .. . Such practices place unacceptable burdens on
the defendant who legitimately insists upon his right to trial."
101. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
102. CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 9, at 136; ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.3(4) (1975); Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea
Bargaining, Part 1, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1059 (1976).
103. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE § 350.3(2) (1975).
104. 395 U.S. at 726. In fact, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure hint that
Hayes-type prosecutorial behavior is not proper in plea bargaining. Rule 11 (e) (1), which
gives examples of proper types of plea agreements, allows the prosecutor to offer, in re-
turn for a plea of guilty, to change the charge to a lesser or related offense, move for dis-
missal of other charges, make a recommendation or agree not to oppose a particular sen-
tence, or agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11 (e). It does not mention the practice of promising the defendant not to seek
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the initial indictment, or that relevant facts had come to light after
the initial indictment.105 Adoption of this rule would increase the
public confidence in the plea bargaining system, insure the protection
of defendants' pretrial rights, and still allow enough flexibility in plea
negotiations to ease the heavy burden on the criminal justice system.
Permitting a defendant to be threatened with reindictment on greater
charges for no other reason than the defendant's rejection of prosecu-
tors' plea offers has no place in the supposedly free-willed give-and-
take nature of plea bargaining.
ALAN M. WISHNOFF
reindictment on greater charges, which is essentially what the prosecutor in Hayes did.
See also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE §
3.1(b); ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.3(1), (3) (1975).
105. See United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
I
